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Abstract 
The paper examines the role of international institutions in preventing the rise of protectionism in 
times of times of crisis. Economic crisis exacerbates uncertainty in the conduct of commercial 
relations and thus makes it more likely for countries to resort to ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ trade 
policies. The historical record of the Great Depression supports this argument, where global 
trade suffered a downward spiral as governments pursued protectionist trade policies as a 
response to domestic pressures. This paper argues that the current era of globalization is 
distinguishable from its earlier counterparts by the presence of an extensive network of 
international institutions, which serve as conveyors of information that help to mitigate the 
information problem that prevails in prisoner‘s dilemma settings. Specifically, international 
institutions such as the WTO, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and other international 
economic organizations increase the flow of information among countries. In doing so, they 
alleviate coordination problems as well as facilitate the detection of violations in commitments to 
maintaining a liberal trade regime. We suggest that this mechanism may explain why the current 
crisis is not replicating the pattern of the Great Depression. Moreover, we explore the combined 
effect of membership in international organization and political variables, the latter including 
democracy, veto players, partisanship of government, and government effectiveness. We test this 
argument using a newly-compiled dataset of trade policies during the current economic crisis and 
membership in international organizations. The paper finds strong support for the informational 
role of international institutions as a key factor preventing the rise of protectionism in times of 
crisis. Conversely, there is mixed evidence that the combining effect of international 
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Introduction 
The current global economic crisis is widely regarded as the most serious setback for the 
international economy since the Great Depression and one which has brought a host of 
governance issues to the fore, ranging from reform of banking regulations to reform of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The impact of the crisis has not been limited to the financial 
sector in which it originated but has extended to virtually all areas of international economic 
interactions. Among the casualties has been international trade, which saw a historic and steep 
drop in the months following the outbreak of the crisis. The ―great trade collapse‖ (Baldwin 
2009) reflects the trade policy choices of countries that are deeply integrated into the global 
trading system but have shifted their orientation in favor of protectionist measures in an effort to 
cushion the blow of the crisis to their national economies. Measures such as import restrictions, 
export subsidies, anti-dumping measures, and state aid, to name a few, are examples of ―beggar-
thy-neighbor‖ policies adopted by states threaten to lead to an unraveling of liberal global trade. 
While many countries have appealed to such measures, not all have done so, and this pattern of 
state choices informs the main question underlying this paper: what explains the trade policy 
choices of countries in times of crisis?   
 
In addressing this question, this paper highlights the political context of international commercial 
exchange and focuses on the role of international institutions, especially international economic 
organizations, as purveyors of information in times of crisis. The network of international 
institutions or organizations that span a wide range of issues are a distinct feature of the political 
landscape of the last century since the Great Depression and are important for understanding 
governance in this globalization era. We advance the argument that international institutions 
mitigate the uncertainty inherent to sustaining the optimal outcome of liberal trade and in times 
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of crisis, when the uncertainty problem is especially acute, institutions provide information and 
transparency regarding state choices in trade policy and, in doing so, take on an important role in 
the continuation of a liberal trading system. The main hypothesis of our empirical analysis tests 
this argument by analyzing the impact of membership in international organizations on the use of 
protectionist trade policies. 
 
We carry out a quantitative analysis using data provided by Global Trade Alert, which monitors 
and provides real-time information on government measures taken during the current global 
crisis that are likely to affect international trade. We analyze the impact of international 
institutions on the intensity of protectionism of membership in international organizations, 
controlling for other factors that may also affect the adoption and implementation of protectionist 
measures. In addition to controls for economic variables, the analysis explores the impact of 
international organization on protectionism as a function of domestic political factors that 
strongly act on the push and pull over trade policy. These include democracy as a proxy for 
regime type, partisanship of the government in power, veto players, and government 
effectiveness. The analysis distinguishes between the effects of membership in international 
economic and political organizations and also between interventionist and non-interventionist 
organizations. This paper finds that membership in international economic organizations and in 
preferential trade agreements reduce the likelihood and extent of adopting protectionist trade 
measures.  We also find that neither membership in political international organizations nor the 
institutional capacity for enforcement distinguishing interventionist and non-interventionist 
organizations has any significant impact on the adoption of protectionism. Rather, our findings 
suggest strong support for the informational and commitment functions of international 
economic institutions and its role in preventing the rise of protectionism in times of crisis. 
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Finally, there is mixed evidence that the combining effect of international organizations and 
domestic political variables matters in explaining protectionism during this crisis.  
   
Immediately below we provide the theoretical framework of our paper, including the major 
points of comparison between the Great Depression and the current crisis and our main argument 
on the role of institutions in international trade. The research design section discusses case 
selection, model specification and data. The subsequent section reports the findings of the 
analysis and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the paper for understanding 
trade policy choices in times of crisis.  
 
Institutions, Information, and Trade Policy in Times of Crisis 
The 1930s Depression era saw the ―Contracting Spiral of World Trade,‖ as reported by the 
League of Nations‘ Economic Survey for 1932-1933 (Eichengreen and Irwin 1995, 4-5), as 
countries turned their backs on the liberal trading order and appealed instead to ―beggar-thy-
neighbor‖ policies that sought to shield national economies from the economic crisis. By 1932, 
the volume of world trade had fallen by 40 percent (Irwin 1993, 112). World trade disintegrated 
as countries put in place higher tariffs, the most notable example of this being the adoption of the 
famous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 in the United States. Countries imposed import quotas, 
subsidies, licensing requirements as well as exchange controls. Bilateralism was rampant in this 
period (Culbertson 1937, Snyder 1940), as bilateral trade agreements were concluded to balance 
trade on a case-by-case basis and to preserve hard currency or gain political advantage. Trade 
became increasingly concentrated in blocs through arrangements such as the Ottawa Agreement 
of 1932 that created Imperial Preference in Great Britain‘s trade with its dominions or through 
currency blocs linking one large economy with a set of smaller economies (Feinstein, Temin, and 
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Toniolo 1997; Pomfret 1988, Chapter 3). Exchange controls and clearing arrangements to 
stabilize exchange rates promoted intra-bloc trade while actively discriminating against those 
outside the bloc. Thus the 1930s was, according to Douglas Irwin, a ―disaster in the field of 
commercial policy‖ (1995, 324), and the trade and exchange rate policies pursued in this period 





The record of international trade during the Depression era prompts comparison to the possible 
consequences for international trade of the current global economic crisis, widely recognized as 
the most serious economic crisis in the seventy years that have passed since then. Concerns about 
the consequences of the global economic crisis for international trade is what prompted figures 
such as Pascal Lamy, director-general of the WTO, to urge countries not to adopt protectionist 
trade policy as a way to insulate national economies from the effects of the crisis, warning that, 
as the Great Depression illustrates, ―protectionism and economic isolationism do not work‖ 
(2008).
2
 Indeed, the current global crisis, as Baldwin notes, led to ―the great trade collapse,‖ a 
―sudden, severe, and synchronized‖ fall in global trade between the third quarter of 2008 and the 
second quarter of 2009, when global trade flows were 15% below their previous year‘s levels 
(2009).
3
 Though not as great in magnitude as that of the Great Depression, ―the treat of trade 
collapse‖ was steeper, falling in the span of nine months what took 24 months during the Great 
Depression.  Overall, this was the steepest decline in global trade on record and greatest in 
magnitude since the Great Depression.  
 
                                                          
2―Lamy warns against protectionism amid financial crisis,‖ 24 September 2008. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl101_e.htm. 
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In understanding the link between economic crisis and trade policy in this globalization era, and 
especially the prospects for sustaining a liberal trade system in a time of global economic crisis, 
we direct attention to a key variable in the political environment of international trade: 
international institutions. We argue that the current era is distinguishable from that of the Great 
Depression by the presence of an extensive network of international institutions that provide 
governance functions in the international economy.
4
 Chief among such international institutions 
is the World Trade Organization (WTO), and, as one study argues, the absence of such a 
multilateral institution to ―constrain‖ states led to the adoption of restrictive trade policies during 
the Depression era (Gregory, Henn, MacDonald and Saito 2010, 7). Even in the case of 
preferential trade agreements, which have seen a rapid rise in recent years, their configuration, in 
contrast to the trade and currency ―bloc‖ formation of the 1930s that was also highly 
regionalized, is more akin to a ―spaghetti bowl‖ (Bhagwati, 1995) with numerous overlapping 
memberships in trade agreements that are not solely regional but often link states in different 
regions.  
 
The trading system of the interwar years was a ―nonsystem‖ (Irwin 1995, 324), lacking any 
institutional mechanism comparable to what exists now to promote the reduction of the trade 
barriers. In contrast, the great power politics that has shaped the course of global trade since the 
end of World War II has centered on a ―constitutional order‖ founded on strategic restraint on the 
part of the winning state—the United States—and institutional binding of less powerful states 
(Ikenberry 2001). While earlier eras of globalization were driven largely by private economic 
actors, the globalization of the post-World War II era has proceeded within a vast and extensive 
                                                          
4
 Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) argue that the current global crisis also differs from the Great 
Depression in terms of the policy instruments available to governments..  
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network of state-led institutions that have managed political and economic relations among 
countries. It is this expressly political aspect of the international economy that is the focus of this 
paper on how states fashion trade policy in times of crisis.  
 
Institutions and Information 
The protectionist policies of the interwar Depression era demonstrate the dominant tendency of 
states to ―defect‖ from a liberal trading order as a response to heightened uncertainty in times of 
economic crisis. Government policies responded with protectionism not only in the Great 
Depression of the interwar years but also in the earlier Great Depression of 1873 when prices of 
agricultural goods fell on the international market, threatening the gold standard in affected 
countries (Frieden 2006, 8-9). The turn to protectionism as a response to economic crisis 
illustrates prominently the collaboration problem inherent in maintaining a liberal trading 
system, represented in the classic single-shot Prisoners‘ Dilemma.  In the absence of a central 
authority such as a hegemon or an institutional mechanism to enforce the optimal outcome of 
liberal trade, actors lefts to their own rational devices will ―defect‖ from this outcome by 
pursuing protectionist policies without regard to its impact on the international system. Such 
defections have the effect of devolving throughout the international economy as countries 
retaliate in response to others‘ ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ policies, thus reducing aggregate welfare, 
precluding the gains that can accrue from liberal trade, and leaving everyone in a worse position 
than before such policies were adopted.  
 
In the case of the Great Depression, this global crisis coincided with the decline of Pax 
Britannica, in which the age of golden age capitalism led by Great Britain and its adherence to 
the gold standard saw a decline that began in the late 19
th
 century that was reinforced after World 
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War I. As Kindleberger argues in his classic volume on the Great Depression, the international 
trading system lacked a strong central actor to uphold a liberal trading order (1973[1986]), and 
by the time of the Great Depression international trade centered in Europe had degenerated into a 
network of discriminatory trading blocs.  
 
Whereas economic crisis exacerbates uncertainty in the conduct of commercial relations, 
institutions serve as conveyors of information that help to mitigate the information problem that 
prevails in prisoner‘s dilemma settings. International institutions promote cooperation among 
participants and thus mitigate the collaboration problem of liberal international trade in several 
ways.  In trade, institutions such as the WTO create expectations of repeated interaction and thus 
render participants more aware of the ―shadow of the future‖ and the long-term costs of 
defection.  International institutions also reduce transaction costs as they provide negotiating fora 
through regular meetings and a set of common rules for behavior. Most relevant to this paper, 
institutions provide transparency and information regarding participants‘ policies, and for 
multilateral trade cooperation, such characteristics enable countries to pursue reciprocity 
strategies when cheating occurs and to enforce the institution‘s rules (Oye 1986). Institutions 
specifically devoted to trade liberalization, such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and the 
World Trade Organization, also have the effect of locking- in commitments that make reneging 
less likely, even in times of crisis. 
 
Institutions are one type of international regime, defined in the classic volume on the subject as 
―principles, norms, rules, and decision–making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area‖ (Krasner 1983, 1).  In the area of commercial exchange, 
institutions transform trade from a single-play Prisoners‘ Dilemma to an iterated game in which 
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the ―shadow of the future‖ figures strongly in the behavioral choices of actors. In doing so, 
institutions reduce uncertainty about the behavior of participating actors and the risks of making 
agreements. Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing information about participant behavior 
and preferences. Indeed, as a mechanism to redress market-failure problems, Keohane (1984) 
emphasizes that the most important of an institution‘s functions may informational (92), that is, 
in providing transparency regarding the preferences and behavior of participating actors. 
In addition, the informational function of institutions takes place within a set of mechanisms that 
include formal legal procedures and rules that ―lock in‖ state commitments and create strong 
expectations about future behavior. By providing mechanisms for resolving disputes, formal 
channels of communication and consultation, and rules for decision-making, institutions allow 
for greater communication among participants, making it difficult for participants to renege on 
their institutional obligations without incurring great political costs. Institutions also create 
transgovernmental ―connections, routines, and coalitions‖ that promote the continuity of state 
policies consistent with institutional obligations and also generate an institutional ―spillover‖ 
process that may reinforce policy orientations outside an institution‘s particular scope (Ikenberry 
2001, 66-68). 
 
In spite of the importance of an institution‘s informational function in reducing uncertainty, the 
uncertainty problem of international cooperation is greatly exacerbated in times of economic 
crisis, as the crisis is attended by a lack of information about how actors will address its effects 
on individual economies and some are increasingly pressured from within to ―defect‖ from a 
liberal trading order and enact protectionist trade policy. Heightened uncertainty in times of 
economic crisis, therefore, threatens to unravel the current liberal trading order. We advance the 
argument that institutions are important in preventing states from pursuing protectionist policies 
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in times of economic crisis and to maintaining a liberal trading system.  Institutions continue to 
reduce uncertainty through two key functions. First, institutions continue to function as conduits 
of information and thus enhance transparency in the preferences and behavior of institutional 
participants. Second, institutions, as they ―lock in‖ particular policies, tend to exhibit ―stickiness‖ 
even in times of crisis and high uncertainty, thus making it difficult for sudden policy changes to 
occur. 
 
In the current economic crisis, international institutions have indeed taken on an important role 
in providing information and monitoring states‘ trade policies. The Group of 20 (G-20) 
countries, for example, pledged publicly and explicitly in November 2008 to ―refrain from 
raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export 
restrictions, or implementing WTO-inconsistent measures to stimulate exports‖ (in Gregory et al. 
2010, 10). They reiterated their commitment to ―resist protectionism and promote global trade‖ 
in summits in April and September 2009. They also mandated the WTO, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) to provide monitoring functions to ensure their adherence and ―to 
report publicly‖ on their trade and investment activities.5 These public pronouncements comprise 
valuable pieces of information for other actors in the global economy, as they express the 
continued commitment of the world‘s largest and most important economies to open trade during 
these uncertain times and their intention not to adopt protectionist policies.  
 
                                                          
5
 http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_2649_34887_44939305_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
Accessed 1 September 2010. 
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In response to the request of the G-20 countries, the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD have provided 
on a regular basis their ―Report on G-20 Trade and Investment Measures.‖6 The most recent of 
these reports, released in June 2010, found that the G-20 countries continued to adhere to their 
commitment not to raise restrictions on trade and investment.
7
 The WTO for its part, as the most 
important international institution devoted trade governance, issued in November 2009 at its 
Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference (Geneva) its annual ―Overview of Developments in the 
International Trading Environment,‖ which highlighted the impact of the global economic crisis 
on the trade and trade-related developments in 2009.
8
 The report is a survey prepared by the 
WTO Secretariat that provides a descriptive analysis of key trade and trade-related measures of 
all its member countries.
9
 As did the joint report by the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD, the WTO 
report found that ―no WTO Member has retreated into widespread trade restriction or 
protectionism,‖ and that for the most part, the global economy remains as open as it was at the 
start of the crisis (3). In addition to these official multilateral organizations, other unofficial 
entities such as the Global Trade Alert (GTA), with ties to the Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research and the World Bank and is the organization from which we draw the data for this 
study, also provide important monitoring activities to detect and provide information about 
―defections‖ from the current trade regime.   
 
                                                          
6
 As of this writing, three reports have been issued: September 2009, March 2010, and June 
2010. 
7
 http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_2649_34887_44939305_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
Accessed 1 September 2010. 
8
 WT/TPR/OV/12 (18 November 2009). 
 
9
 The report includes sections tariffs, trade remedy measures, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT), measures affecting trade in services, trade policy 
reviews, and regional trade agreements. 
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Transparency and Commitment: the Role of International Organizations 
We test our argument on the informational function of institutions by analyzing the impact of 
membership in international organizations on states‘ trade policies during the current global 
economic crisis. In order to capture the effects of transparency and of commitments, the analysis 
relies on two aspects of international organizations in formulating the hypotheses of interest. 
First, the number of international organizations to which a country belongs indicates the degree 
of transparency that attends its actions. Though not indicative of the variation in degrees of 
transparency across international organizations, the number of international organization 
memberships reflects the degree to which a country‘s actions are ―visible‖ outside its borders and 
thus makes it an appropriate proxy for transparency that is attributable to international 
organization membership. The analysis, detailed in the sections to follow, includes both political 
and economic international organizations and their impact on state behavior. Our main 
hypothesis is that countries with more memberships in international organization are less likely 
to enact trade politics that ―defect‖ from a liberal trading order: 
 
 Hypothesis 1:  the higher the number of international organization membership, the 
lower the frequency of a country’s adoption of protectionist trade policies. 
 
 In testing this hypothesis, the analysis differentiates between political and economic 
international organizations, which are expected to differ in their relative impact. While political 
organizations are important in the non-economic arena, we expect that international 
organizations devoted to economic issues are far more relevant in their informational function in 
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times of crisis and thus more effective in preventing the adoption of protectionist trade policies.
10
 
In addition, the analysis also distinguishes between interventionist and non-interventionist 
international organizations, in which the former are characterized by the institutional capacity to 
enforce organizational obligations.  
 
Second, if institutions ―lock-in‖ commitments to a liberal trade policy, then those institutional 
arrangements specifically devoted to trade liberalization are key indicators of states‘ 
commitment to liberal trade. To capture this effect of states‘ commitments, the analysis utilizes 
participation in PTAs and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as indicators of commitment to 
liberal trade, and hence a commitment not to resort to protectionism. Such commitments are 
especially important in preventing protectionism in times of crisis. Institutions such as PTAs and 
the WTO provide important information about trade policy behavior on the part of participants 
and thus functioning as institutional mechanisms for greater transparency. More important and 
relevant for the second hypothesis of this paper, these institutions also embody and affirm the 
commitment to liberal trade through their very substantive provisions. Moreover, these trade 
agreements have the force of law, carrying, to varying degrees, legal obligation on the part of 
participants to abide by agreement terms. Therefore, this hypothesis highlights the commitment 
function of trade agreements as a particular form of international institution devoted to 
maintaining liberal trade and thus eschewing protectionist trade policies that violate participants‘ 
commitments, which is applicable also to times of crisis:  
 
 Hypothesis 2: the higher the number of PTA membership and/or the WTO, the lower 
frequency of participant states’ adoption of protectionist trade policies. 
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 For a similar distinction see Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008).  
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Joint Effects:  International Organization Membership and Domestic Politics 
We also advance the argument that the transparency and commitment functions of international 
institutions and the degree to which they prevent discriminatory state measures is significantly 
mediated by the presence of domestic political conditions. Countries that are deeply integrated 
into the network of international organizations are expected to demonstrate more trade 
cooperation and thus fewer incidences of resorting to protectionism in trade policy. At the same 
time, this effect of international organizations also depends on whether the domestic political 
features of a country make trade cooperation feasible. The analysis therefore tests the interaction 
effects of international organization membership with four domestic politics variables: 
democracy, veto players, partisanship, and government effectiveness.  
 
Where governments are more susceptible to interest group pressures and bear directly on trade 
policy formation, we would expect that protectionism is more likely and more frequent, even in 
the presence of extensive obligations and commitments to international institutions. 
Governments in democracies, in contrast to autocracies, are less insulated from societal 
pressures, and thus in times of crisis, may be more likely to adopt protectionist policies as a 
result of their susceptibility to lobbying by domestic special interest groups. To capture this 
dimension of the domestic political dimension of trade protectionism, the analysis tests the joint 
effect of international organization membership and democracy on protectionism. We also test 
the interaction effect of international organization membership and partisanship, along the lines 
of Grieco, Gelpi, and Warren (2009) that finds that shifts to the left in the partisanship of 
government are associated with lower compliance with international treaty commitments and 
Ehrlich (2007) that finds left-wing governments to be associated with more protectionism (598). 
The analysis examines the mirror version of this argument and highlights the role of right-wing 
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governments in complying with commitments to liberal trade policy. We expect that right-wing 
governments with extensive international organization memberships will be less likely to 
institute protectionist trade policies and therefore will be associated with fewer incidences of 
such ―defections:‖  
 
In addition to the above domestic politics variables of interest, we consider also interaction 
effects of international organization membership with veto players and with government 
effectiveness. We expect that the greater the number of veto players, combined with extensive 
international organization membership, the less likely that governments would be able to adopt 
protectionist measures. A greater number of veto players would be strongly suggestive of a wide 
range of divergent preferences regarding trade policy that both pushes and pulls the government 
from adopting protectionist measure. Hence the policy outcome is unlikely to veer much away 
from the status quo, thus resulting in lower incidences of protectionism relative to other 
governments with fewer veto players. We consider the joint effect of international organization 
membership with government effectiveness, the latter as a measure that indicates the capacity of 
a country to manage its economy effectively in times of crisis. The expectation is that for 
countries with high levels of international organization membership, the more effective 
governments will also be more ―successful‖ at staving off protectionist pressures and thus be 
associated with fewer incidences of protectionist measures.  
 
We report the findings of our analysis on the combined effects of international organization 
membership and domestic politics in a separate section. Immediately below we present the 
research design and the results of the analysis.  
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Model and Case Selection 
To test our hypothesis that the network of international organizations decreases states probability 
to implement protectionist policies, we implement a cross-sectional analysis using a newly-
compiled dataset including 167 countries that have data available on. Specifically, we carry out 
two different analyses: a monadic analysis and a dyadic one.
11
 The operationalization of 
variables presents two main challenges. On the one hand, we need a reliable and systematic way 
to capture state defections from trade cooperation in the current crisis. On the other hand, we 
need to categorize IGOs in relation to both their function, i.e. economic vs. political IGOs, and 
their structure, i.e. institutionalized vs. non-institutionalized IGOs. The former categorization 
allows us to test the claim that economic IGOs are more effective than political IGOs to inhibit 
state defections. The latter categorization helps us to see if IGOs impacts state behaviour during 
the crisis by raising information or by lock-in state commitments or both. Below we describe 
these variables as well as other control variables included in our models for both the monadic 
and dyadic analysis.  
 
Dependent variable 
Our monadic dependent variable captures the number of protectionist measures taken by states 
during the current economic downturn that are likely to affect foreign commerce. We label this 
variable Protectionism. Our dyadic dependent variable measures the captures the number of 
                                                          
11
 Country is the unit of observation in a monadic cross-sectional analysis, whereas pair is the 
unit of observation in a dyadic cross-sectional analysis. Note: we use direct dyads, so we include 
both the pair ij and ji. In other words, the first country in the dyad is always the one that 
implements protectionist policies, whereas the second country in the dyad is always the one that 
is targeted.   
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protectionist measures taken by country i against country j.
12
 We label this variable Dyadic 
Protectionism. Data come from Global Trade Alert (henceforth, GTA), which is co-ordinated by 
the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent academic think-tank based in London, 
UK. GTA monitors a large number of countries in the world, drawing upon expertise from 
independent research institutes in seven regions.  In addition, GTA identifies those trading 
partners that are likely to be harmed by protectionist measures, as well as the type of measures 
implemented, e.g. bail out measures, export subsidies, etc. Moreover, these data are up-to-date, 
since GTA provides real-time information, and is freely accessible.
13
   
 
We collected data on protectionist measures that were implemented between January 2008 to the 
26
th
 of December 2009. We ended up with 604 protectionist measures.
14
 In line with our 
theoretical framework we are interested in measuring beggar-thy-neighbor policies implemented 
by countries during the current crisis. Accordingly, our dependent variable captures every 
protectionist measure that includes nationalistic provisions distorting the market and harming 
trading partners exporters, investors, and workers. For instance, in December 2009 the Canadian 
government announced that it would provide up to 173 million Canadian dollars in loans to 
Bombardier Inc. to complete and deliver an order to Sweden‘s Scandinavian Airlines.15 This 
measure affected several Bombardier‘s competitors in Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, 
                                                          
12
 Note: the majority of protectionist policies affect more than one country. Accordingly, these 
multilateral protectionist policies are broken down in a bilateral fashion. See the literature on 
trade agreements for a similar approach (Mansfield et al., 2002). 
13
 Data are available at www.globaltradealert.org.  
14
 GTA marks each measure in red if it certainly discriminates against foreign commercial 
interests; in amber if it is likely to discriminate against foreign commercial interests; in green if 
it involves liberalization. We dropped these last measures from the analysis. 
15
 Bombardier Inc. is Canada‘s largest aircraft producer and the third-largest civilian aircraft 
producer in the world. It employs approximately 17,000 people in Canada.  
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United Kingdom, and the US. Similarly, in September 2008 Germany notified rescue aid for 
Delitzscher Schokoladen GmbH, a company active in the manufacture and trade of cocoa, 
chocolate, and sugar confectionery.
16
 This measure discriminates against the foreign commercial 
interests of the other EU member countries.  
 
Figure 1 shows the five countries that implemented the largest number of unfair trade practices 
in our sample. There are three main considerations to take into account here. First, the biggest 
countries cheat the most. This is not surprising since big countries have a large number of trade 
partners, operate commercially in almost every sector, and often have a high level of bargaining 
power internationally. Second, large developing countries take the lead in cheating. In particular, 
BRIC countries are responsible for almost a third of the total number of measures implemented 
during the period under investigation. This result is a testament to the increasing power of these 
states. Third, and somewhat surprisingly, European countries cheated less than other large and 
powerful states in this new round of protectionism. Germany is the only European country 




 Finally, these three features are consistent with 





[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Delitzscher Schokoladen GmbH was originally established in 1894 and its main customers are 
numerous German food retail chains as well as European and international trade companies.  
17




 position. However, they are 
below countries such as Kazakhstan, Australia, Turkey, South Africa, Japan, and South Korea. 
18




 2010, page 26. 
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Figure 2 shows the five countries against which the largest number of unfair trade practices was 
implemented in our sample. In line with Figure 1, large countries are more likely to be a target 
for protectionist policies. However, differently from what stated above, developed countries are 
more likely to be targeted by protectionist policies. Indeed, the top ―targeted‖ countries are 
usually European countries or the US. China is the only developing country that appears among 
the top 15 ―targets‖.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As the figure below shows, the majority of unfair measures concerns anti-dumping provisions. 
Specifically, countries impose definitive antidumping duties on imports to protect strategic 
sectors. This finding is in keeping with the trade literature. As Prusa argues, ―anti-dumping laws 
have nothing to do with economically harmful practices; rather, anti-dumping is just a cleverly 
designed form of protectionism‖ (2005: 683-684). Tariff increases, safeguard measures, and state 
aid to troubled industries represent, respectively, 23, 16, and 10 percent of the total amount of 
measures. Surprisingly, there are only five cases of subsidies granted to sectors that face 
difficulties: i) subsidies for the fruits and vegetables sector (France); ii)  wage subsidies for firms 
in financial distress (Poland); iii) interest rate subsidies for the construction sector (UK); iv) 
subsidies for electric cars and batteries (US); v) ―black liquor‖ subsidies to the paper industry 
(US).
19
 Finally, it is important to remark that several of these protectionist policies are only 
weakly related to trade policies stricto sensu. Indeed, there cases of visa restriction, modification 
of standard, etc. Thus, it is the whole international system to be affect by these policies.  
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 Several measures are categorized by GTA as ―State aid in the form of direct grants, loans, 
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Main Explanatory Variables 
Our main monadic independent variable is the number of IGOs joined by each country. We label 
this variable IGOs. Our main dyadic independent variable is the number of joint membership in 
IGOs between country i and country j. We label this variable Dyadic IGOs. IGO membership 
captures the amount of information available to each state during the current crisis. Data comes 
from International Governmental Organization (IGO) Data (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 
2004), which is available up to 2000. The total number of IGOs in our sample is 383. European 
states are the most integrated in IGOs (Pevehouse et al. 2004, 113). Among the countries in our 
sample, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Netherlands joined the largest number of IGOs. 
Moreover, European countries share also the largest number of joint dyadic membership in 
IGOs. Conversely, the least integrated countries in IGOs are usually either small, autocratic 
developing countries or controversial states, such as Taiwan, whose independence is contested in 
diplomatic circles. 
 
In order to test their impact on trade cooperation, we differentiate among types of IGOs in two 
ways. First, different IGOs have different functions. Building upon Ingram et al.‘s (2005) 
categorization, we divide IGOs into two groups: economic IGOs and political IGOs. There are 
109 of the former, which include organizations such as the WDO, the IMF. Note: since we have 
an ad hoc variable for trade agreements (see below), we do not include them in this category. 




 Second, we divide IGOs into interventionist and non-interventionist organizations 
(Ingram et al., 2005). The former contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and 
adjudication and other means to coerce state decisions, e.g. withholding of loans or aid, as well 
as means of enforcement of IGO provisions. The latter have no institutional capacity to coerce 
member states‘ policy choices. There are 39 interventionist IGOs, whereas there are 344 non-
interventionist IGOs. 
 
To assess the ―commitment‖ aspect of international institutions devoted to trade cooperation, we 
also take into account membership in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). PTAs are bilateral 
and plurilateral arrangements among countries that decide to decrease tariffs, e.g. the European 
Union, NAFTA, Asean Pact. During the past 20 years, PTAs have dramatically proliferated. 
Thus, PTAs are currently among the most important instruments of international economic 
policy (Limao, 2007). Due to their emphasis on trade liberalization and their enforcement 
mechanisms, PTAs should be the perfect candidates to show whether or not international 
institutions convey information among countries during the current crisis. In the monadic 
analysis we measure the number of PTAs to which each country belongs to. We label this 
variable PTAs. Conversely, Dyadic PTAs scores 1 if country i and country j are member of the 
same agreement; 0, otherwise.
21
  Data on PTAs comes from Baccini and Dür (2010). Finally, we 
include the variable WTO separately since it is by far the most important international trade 
organization. In the monadic analysis WTO score 1 if country i is a WTO member; 0 otherwise. 
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 We took a conservative approach in selection organizations into the variable Economic IGOs. 
For instance, in contrast to other studies (Cao, 2009), we do not include into economic IGOs 
organizations that rules on standardization.  
21
 Some dyads form more than one PTA mainly because member countries deepen an existing 
agreement, e.g. the EU. Our coding does not capture this event, i.e. our operationalization is 
strictly dichotomous.  
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In the dyadic analysis we include the variable WTO for both the country that cheats and the 
country that is targeted by protectionism policies. Data on WTO membership comes from 
Baccini and Dür (2011). 
 
Control variables 
Since other factors are likely to influence the chances of a country implementing protectionist 
measures, we include a series of characteristics of states under analysis. Doing so is vital to avoid 
overestimating the effect of the main explanatory variables, as parallel policy choices may be a 
result of correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that are common to various countries. 
We hence include several economic and political control variables in our model.
22
  Note: 
regarding the monadic variables we include both the variable of the country that cheats and the 
variable of the country that is targeted by protectionism.  
 
Concerning economic variables, we include the variable (logarithm of) GDP from IMF (2008). 
As previously shown, big countries are more likely to implement protectionist measures. 
Furthermore, we include per capita GDP to measure the level of development of a country. The 
more developed a country is, the easier it should find dealing with a crisis without relying on 
protectionist policies. Indeed, a developed country is in a better position to compensate societal 
groups that face losses arising from the economic downturn. This data is collected by the IMF 
(2008). Moreover, in the monadic analysis we include the variable Trade Openness (trade/GDP) 
to capture the importance of trade for a country.
23
 The prediction of this variable sign is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, open countries are more to lose from a race to increase tariffs and 
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 We use Ehrlich‘s model (2007) as baseline model. 
23
 We have not included Trade Openness in the dyadic analysis, since both trade and GDP 
appears already in the equation. This decision does not affect our main results. 
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so it should be less likely to implement beggar-thy-neighbor policies. On the other hand, more 
globalized countries have been hit harder by the crisis and so they are more likely to protect 
those sectors harmed by the economic downturn. Data for this variable are from the WDI (2008). 
Furthermore, in the dyadic analysis we also include the (logarithm of) bilateral trade flows 
between country i and country j (Trade). Our expectation is that demand of protectionism arises 
only in the actual presence of trade with the targeted countries. Thus, we expect a positive sign 
for the coefficient of this variable. Finally, we include the dummy variable, Exchange Rate, that 
scores one if country i has a floating exchange rate regime. According to Eichengreen and Irwin 
(2009), countries that were free to devalue their currencies were less likely to implement 
protectionist policies during the Great Depression. Data were obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004).  
 
The extent to which transparency and commitment through international organizations is 
effective in preventing the rise of protectionism during economic crisis is expected to be strongly 
mediated and perhaps even conditioned by the domestic politics of trade policy formation, in 
which governments are subject to pressures for protection from special interest groups. This 
pressure is likely to be especially acute in times of crisis, as sectors suffering from the effects of 
the economic crisis are likely to lobby the government for protection. The analysis captures this 
important dynamic behind trade policy formation by examining the effects of four domestic 
politics variables: democracy, partisanship, veto players, and government effectiveness. In 
investigating the importance of these domestic politics variables, the analysis considers their 




The analysis employs the Polity IV (2009) scale to measure the type of regime of each country 
(Type of Regime). The advantage of Polity IV over others is that it covers all of the countries in 
our dataset and provides values for up to and including 2008.
24
 This variable controls for the 
claim that democracies behave differently from autocracies in the international system (Fearon, 
1997; McGillivray and Smith, 2008). We also control for the number of veto players (Henisz, 
2000) that has been found to be an important determinant of trade policy during economic 
downturns (Henisz and Mansfield, 2006). We also control for partisanship, utilizing data from 
DPI (Beck t al.).
25
. Finally, the analysis includes the variable Government Effectiveness to 
control for the credibility of a government‘s commitment to the policies that have been 
formulated and implemented. We expect that high levels of government effectiveness should 
increase the capability of executives to deal with the crisis and therefore decrease the need to 
implement unfair policies. The data were obtained from Kaufmann, Art, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Univariate summary statistics and data sources for all of these monadic and dyadic variables are 
available in Table 1.  
  




In order to test the previous hypotheses, we consider the possibility of selection effects, i.e. 
unobserved factors that control whether or not a country implements ―unfair trade policies‖, 
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 Results do not change if we replace Polity IV with Freedom of House, another widely used 
indicator of the type of regime. 
25
 We do not include this variable in the main model since data is available for a small number of 
countries decreasing substantively our sample. 
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which could introduce systematic bias. For example, only large countries or export-oriented 
countries might employ beggar-thy-neighbor policies, resulting in a flawed interpretation of the 
relative significance of these variables. The sample of unfair trade practices is not random if 
there is a selection process that predetermines whether countries take these practices in the first 
place. To deal with these issues, we use the following specification of Heckman selection model 
known as the HECKIT model (Grier, Minger, and Brian., 1994; Heckman, 1979) in the monadic 
analysis. 
Yi = α 1 Xi + α 2 Vi + ε1          (1) 
Zi = γ + β1 Ui + ε2                (2) 
Y is the dependent variable of the outcome equation, X and V are matrices including respectively 
the main explanatory variables and the control variables of the outcome equation. All these 
variables have been described above. Moreover, Z is the dependent variable of the selection 
equation. Specifically, Z scores 1 if a country implemented at least one protectionist policies in 
the period under investigation; 0 otherwise. 82 (on 167) countries in our sample score 1. U is the 
matrix containing the specification of the selection equation: the natural logarithm of population 
to control for the salience and size of the country and GDP growth.
26
 Finally, γ is the constant, α 
1, α 2, and β1 are vectors of parameters, and ε1 and ε2 are i.i.d. error terms with a constant mean 
and infinite variance. 
Similarly, in the dyadic analysis we use the following specification of Heckman selection. 
Yij = α 1 Xij + α 2 Vij + ε1          (3) 
Zij = γ + β1 Uij + ε2                (4) 
                                                          
26
 We use Population instead of GDP in the selection equation so that at least one variable that is 
included in the selection equation does not appear in the outcome equation (a so-called exclusion 
restriction). As said, we do not include GDP Growth in the outcome equation since GDP appears 
several times in the equation. This choice does not affect our results.  
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All the variables are the same than the ones described above. 1635 (on 27,278) dyads implement 
at least 1 protectionist policy in our sample. Note: since we deal with directed dyads, monadic 
variables refer always to country i, i.e. first country, in the dyad. 
 
In sum, our estimation strategy is to endogenize the probability of a country to implement at least 
one protectionist provision using some economic variables. The estimated probability of 
selection is then used as a regressor in the second stage for analyzing the impact of IGOs on the 
number of unfair measures implemented by states. The econometric logic of the Heckman model 
allows conditioning the estimated mean function in the second stage on the selection process in 
the first stage. Moreover, it takes into account that for each state the probability of implementing 
at least one unfair trade policy affects the likelihood of cooperating or defecting during the crisis. 
Finally, since the data are organized as a cross-section, to control for potential heteroskedasticity 
across countries, we employ robust (Huber-White) standard errors for every estimation. 
  
Main Results 
Monadic Analysis  
Table 2 shows the results of the main models. Model 1 contains a general measurement of IGO 
membership, i.e. without differentiating among types of IGOs. Model 2 distinguishes between 
Economic IGOs, Political IGOs, PTAs, and the WTO. Finally, Model 3 distinguishes between 
Minimal IGOs, Structured IGOs, and Interventionist IGOs.   
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Model 1 shows that there is no evidence that countries that joined a high number of IGOs are 
more likely to cooperate, i.e. to not implement unfair measures. The reason we get this result is 
clear from Model 2. Indeed, on the one hand, countries that joined a large number of economic 
IGOs are less likely to implement protectionist policies during this economic crisis. On the other 
hand, countries that are members of a large number of political IGOs are more likely to pursue 
uncooperative behaviors. The latter finding may be explained by the fact that big countries are 
usually members of a large number of political IGOs.
27
 Thus, as the next section will show, 
India, Russia, and the US are driving this result. Moreover, countries that are members of a large 
number of PTAs are less likely to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies, whereas WTO is not 
statistically significant.  Finally, there is no evidence that IGOs structure impacts the probability 
of cooperation in trade (Model 3).   
 
These results confirm the hypothesis that networks of IGOs reduce the probability of defecting 
by cooperation during this severe economic downturn. Not every IGO has this effect, rather only 
those that have an economic scope or are constituted by trade agreements. We claim that the 
explanation lies with the capability of IGOs to convey information, thereby mitigating the 
prisoner dilemma trap. Our results seem to suggest that only economic IGOs are able to convey 
such information. Moreover, the fact that the structure of IGOs is not statistically significant (and 
the sign is actually positive) seems to imply that information matters more than enforceability in 
relation to IGOs. Specifically, the crucial element here is that economic IGOs membership and 
PTA membership allow countries to collect large amounts of information. In turn, this helps to 
overpass the coordination problem that is particularly severe in a period of economic crisis. 
                                                          
27
 The correlation between Population and Political IGO is .50. 
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Conversely, there is no evidence that IGOs constrain countries‘ behaviors due to the presence of 
sanctioning mechanisms.     
 
 The results of our main variables are not only statistically significant, but they are also 
substantively large. Table 3 shows that Economic IGOs has the largest impact on the dependent 
variables among all the covariates. Specifically, moving from the minimal value to the maximum 
value of this variable decreases the number of protectionist measures by 19. Bearing in mind that 
the maximum value of the dependent variable is 51, the magnitude of this result is quite 
impressive. For instance, since European countries are members of several Economic IGOs, this 
contributes to explaining why they are behaving better than other big countries in terms of trade 
policies during the current crisis. Moreover, although the variable No. of PTAs has the smallest 
impact on the dependent variable among the statistically significant covariates, moving from the 
minimal value to the maximum value of this variable decreases the number of protectionist 
measures by 5. This result is noteworthy, considering that the average number of unfair trade 
policies is 3.5 (see Table 1). In sum, international organizations play an important role in 
reducing unfair trade policies, though other economic and political variables are admittedly (and 
not surprisingly) more important. 
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Regarding the control variables, almost every control covariate that is statistically significant has 
the predicted sign, adding plausibility to our results. Specifically, the size and salience of a 
country strongly affect the probability of implementing protectionist policies (even controlling 
for the selection effect). Moreover, effective governments are less likely to cheat. The only 
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exception is the variable Type of Regime, which is positive, though statistically significant only 
in Model 3. Thus, democracies are actually more likely to implement protectionist trade policies 
according to our analysis. This finding goes against the claim that democratic regimes comply 
more than autocratic regime internationally. A possible explanation of this result is that 
democratic leaders are sensitive to interest groups and to voters who usually ask protection 
during economic downturn (Henisz and Mansfield, 2006). Furthermore, Veto Players and 
Exchange rate are not statistically significant in any of the three models. Finally, regarding the 
selection equation, GDP is by far the strongest predictor, always positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the positive sign of Trade Openness shows that the more open a country is, 
the more likely it is to implement at least one protectionist policy. 
  
Dyadic Analysis  
As Table 4 shows, the main results hold also for the dyadic analysis. Specifically, Dyadic IGOs 
has the opposite sign than expected (Model 4). Thus, by pooling all IGOs together there is no 
evidence that they have a positive impact in reducing the number of protectionist policies. 
However, in line with the previous estimations, Dyadic Econ IGOs and PTAs have both negative 
sign and are statistically significant at 95 percent level (Model 5). Moreover, and differently 
from Model 2, being both countries are member of the WTO strongly reduce the probability of 
implementing protectionist policies one against the other. Indeed, the coefficient of WTO is 
negative and statistically significant at 99 percent level. This result is not surprising from both a 
theoretical and methodological point of view. Theoretically, only if both countries are WTO 
member, we might expect that they would refrain from implementing protectionist policies either 
because countries share information about each other's trade policies or because they fear 
retaliation. Methodologically, in the monadic analysis WTO has little variation among 
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observations since almost every country is now a WTO member.  Finally, Model 6 confirms that 
the type of IGOs structure has no impact upon the probability of reducing protectionist policies.     
 
The results of our main variables are not only statistically significant, but they are also 
substantively large. Regarding Dyadic Econ IGOs moving from the minimal value to the 
maximum value of this variable decreases the number of protectionist measures by 2. Bearing in 
mind that the mean of the dependent variable is .17, the magnitude of this result is quite 
impressive. Moreover, being part of the same PTA and being member of the WTO decreases the 
number of protectionist measures by respectively .47 and 4.85. Especially, the result of the WTO 
variable is particularly noteworthy. In sum, although economic variables have a larger impact on 
the probability of implementing protectionist policies, the dyadic analysis confirms that 
international organizations played an important role in reducing unfair trade policies during the 
current economic crisis. 
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Regarding the control variables, GDP, GDPpc, and Gov. Effect are statistically significant and 
have the predicted sign, adding plausibility to our results. Furthermore, the variable Trade that is 
not included in the dyadic analysis has the positive sign as expected. Moreover, democracies and 
countries with a large number of veto powers are more likely to implement protectionist policies 
in line with the monadic findings above. Government Effectiveness is negative (and statistically 
significant) and associated with a lower incidence of protectionism in the instigating country, 
whereas Government Effectiveness is positive (and statistically significant) in the target country. 
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Furthermore, and interestingly, Exchange Rate is positive and statistically significant at 99 per 
cent in every dyadic model. Thus, there is no evidence that Eichengreen and Irwin‘s (2009) 
argument holds during the current crisis. To conclude, a note on the econometric model that we 
decided to implement is necessary. Results demonstrate the superiority of the Heckman model 
over competing specifications. Specifically, since ρ, which measures the correlation between the 
errors of the first and second stage, differs significantly from 0, a Heckman model is the only 
efficient and unbiased estimator in light of the theoretical framework developed in this paper. 
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International Organizations and Domestic Politics 
In the previous section we show that economic IGOs and PTAs impact upon the probability of 
implementing protectionist policies during the current economic crisis. In this section, we report 
the findings of our analysis on the combined effects of international organization membership 
with four key domestic politics variables: democracy, partisanship, veto players, and government 
effectiveness. Table 6 reports the results of the constitutive dyadic model with the interaction 
terms between economic IGOs and PTAs on the one side and domestic politics variables on the 
other side.
28
 Note: since the domestic variables are highly correlated one to another, we include 
them separately in different model specifications. 
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 We do not report the results of the monadic models that are very similar to the dyadic ones and 
that are available upon request. 
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The interpretation of these interaction terms is not straightforward. As Brambor et al. (2006: 72) 
point out, the coefficients on constitutive terms cannot be interpreted as unconditional marginal 
effects. Thus, to appropriately interpret results in Table 6, we use graphical support. Specifically, 
following the suggestion of Brambor et al. (2006: 73), we need to choose meaningful marginal 
effects for the domestic variables, since both these variables and Econ. IGOs are modifying 
variables. Accordingly, we anchor the value of Regime to seven or more than seven, i.e. 
democracies, the value of Veto Players to .5 or more than 0.5, i.e. large number of veto powers, 
and Government Effectiveness to zero or more than zero, i.e. high government effectiveness. 
Then, we study the marginal effect of domestic variables on the probability of implementing 
protectionist policies as Econ. IGOs changes their value from zero (minimum) to 19 (maximum). 
 
The effects of the interaction terms between Econ. IGOs and domestic variables are shown in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. Specifically, the impact of regime on the probability of protectionism is 
negative (and statistically significant at 95 percent) only as two countries share the membership 
of a large number of economic IGOs. We obtain similar findings for veto players, government 
effectiveness, and partisanship. The magnitude of the results is also striking. For instance, being 
both a democracy and sharing membership with country j in a large number of economic IGOs 
decreases by 12 the number of protectionism policies. In the case of Econ, IGOs, results of 
interaction terms lead to a rejection of the additive model since the combining effect of economic 
international organizations and domestic variables is an important predictor of the probability of 
protectionism. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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Finally, the effects of the interaction terms between PTAs and domestic variables are shown in 
Figure 6. Note: since PTA is a dummy, we do not anchor the value of the domestic variables in 
this case. Specifically, we show the effect of PTA (holding PTA equals one) on protectionism 
modifying the value of the domestic variables. Here only the interaction term between PTA and 
Partisanship is statistically significant at 95 percent and negative as expected from our theory. 
Conversely, the interaction terms between PTA and regime, veto players, and government 
effectiveness are not statistically significant.
29
 Thus, in the case of PTA, results of interaction 
terms lead to a rejection of the constitute model. In other words, there is little evidence that the 
combining effect of PTAs and domestic variables is an important predictor of the probability of 
protectionism. 
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Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the empirical results, we made a series of changes to the base models 
and we implement matching techniques to tackle the selection bias problem. All the robustness 
checks described below are performed on both the monadic models and the dyadic models. 
 
Model specification. First, and most importantly, since our dependent variable is a count 
variable, an OLS regression may be inconsistent due to the fact that the dependent variable  does 
                                                          
29
 Results for veto players and government effectiveness are not reported and are available upon 
request. 
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not have  a normal distribution, i.e. the distribution is skewed to the right (Wooldridge, 2002: 52-
53).
30
 Thus, we estimate Model 2 and Model 4 using a count data regression to check if our main 
results still hold. To take into account the selection bias problem, we first run a probit model and 
we obtain the probability of states implementing at least one protectionist measures (GDP 
Growth and Population as explanatory variables). Then, we get the linear predictions to calculate 
the ―inverse Mills ratio‖ (the λ coefficient), and use it in the second stage regression in which we 
implement a negative binomial regression.
31
 As Table 7 shows, results are very similar to those 
presented in Table 2 and Table 4, confirming the validity of our previous findings for both the 
monadic analysis (Model 2) and the dyadic analysis (Model 5). 
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Furthermore, regarding model specification we estimate previous equations using a truncated 
count-data model and a zero-inflated Poisson.
32
 Results are very similar to ones reported above. 
Moreover, we dropped India, Russia, and United States from the analysis to check if our results 
are driven by these three countries, which are responsible for a large number of protectionist 
measures. In addition, we use the natural logarithm of the variable Protectionism to both 
decrease the impact of outliers and obtain a more normally distributed dependent variable. Even 
with these two changes we get comparable results in the sign and level of significance of our 
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 Since in the monadic analysis the mean of our dependent variable is not very close to zero, ―a 
normal approximation and related regression may be satisfactory‖ (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998: 
2). Conversely, the dyadic analysis raises serious concerns on the consistency of the second stage 
estimation in the Heckman model.  
31
 A likelihood ratio test shows that we have a problem with over dispersion data. Thus, the 
ordinary Poisson cannot be used here. 
32
 In line with the Heckman model, we predict the excessive zeroes in the outcome variable using 
Population. 
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main variables. Interestingly, Political IGOs is not statistically significant in these two last 
regressions. Thus, our intuition that big countries drive the result of this variable is confirmed by 
this further analysis. 
 
Matching. The use of the Heckman model to control for the selection bias is not unproblematic 
(Sartori, 2003). To further check the robustness of our findings, we implement the coarsened 
exact matching (CEM) that ―is a non-parametric method of controlling for some of or all the 
confounding influence of pre-treatment control variables in observational data‖ (Blackwell et al., 
2009: 526).  Put simply, matching drops observations from the data to achieve a better balance 
between the treated and the control groups, ―meaning that the empirical distributions of the 
covariates (X1, X2, …, Xk) in the groups are more similar‖ (Blackwell et al., 2009: 526). In sum, 
matching procedures allow us to accomplish a counterfactual comparison by ‗‗trimming down‘‘ 
the sample of states so that the ‗‗control‘‘ (i.e., not PTA and WTO members) and ‗‗treatment‘‘ 
(i.e., PTA and WTO members) groups are balanced on all other covariates in the model, e.g. the 
distribution of GDP among the treatment group in the matched samples should be very similar to 
that of the control group (Ho et al, 2007). Note: we are able to using the matching technique only 
with PTA and WTO, since they are the only treatments, i.e. dummies, among our main 
covariates. 
 
The main difference between CEM and approximate matching, e.g. Mahalanobis Distance 
Matching (MDM) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM), is that with the former method we do 
not have to control further for the covariates, since they are unrelated to the treatment variable. In 
other words, the treatment and the control group are perfectly balanced after having implemented 
CEM. There are several reasons to prefer CEM to other matching methods. First, recent studies 
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that employ simulations in real datasets show that CEM outperforms MDM and PSM (King et 
al., 2010). Moreover, CEM requires fewer assumptions and has more attractive statistical 
properties for many applications than the other two matching methods (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
Finally, CEM is fast and easy to implement.  
 
Using CEM we control the robustness of our previous results in four steps. First, we select the 
covariates that we use to balance the treatment group and the control group. Specifically, we use 
all the control variables from the outcome model. Moreover, we grouped the continuous 
covariates according to the quintiles of their empirical distribution, i.e. observations in the first 
10 percentile of the distribution of each variable were grouped together, as were observations 
falling in the second 10 percentile, and so on. Regime was ―coarsened‖ into two bins, i.e. lower 
than 7 and higher than 7. The dummy variable Exchange Rate could not be ―coarsened‖ any 
further. Second, using the command CEM in STATA, we identify these observations that contain 
at least one treated and one control unit and we drop all the others. Note: we lose roughly 90 
percent of the observations; this is the reasons why we are unable to use this technique in our 
main models. Third, we run again a negative binomial estimation on this sub-sample including 
only PTA and WTO as treatment. Our main findings remain unchanged with both PTA and 
WTO negative and statistically significant at 95 percent level. 
 
Conclusion 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb and George Soros disagree probably on several economic, political, and 
philosophical issues, but not on the seriousness of this global economic turmoil. The former 
thinker defines the current crisis as ―vastly worse‖ than the 1930s because of the interdependence 
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of the financial systems and economies worldwide.
33
 The latter billionaire investor states that 
―the world faces the worst finance crisis since WWII‖.34 The two experts are not alone in this 
comparison. Several other scholars and policy makers, such as Bernanke, Stiglitz, and Volker, 
have compared the two crises in the past months. Similarly, there is an emerging consensus that 
the outbreak in protectionism feared at the beginning of the crisis has been avoided so far (Calì, 
2009; Evenett, Hoekman, and Cattaneo, 2009). To be clear, protectionism did increase since the 
beginning of the crisis, as shown by Evenett (2009), but not as much as expected, and especially 
not as much as in 1930s.  
 
We started from these two basic observations related to the current crisis and the Great 
Depression, i.e. the similarity in terms of magnitude and the dissimilarity in terms of trade policy 
response, to propose a simple explanation on why the protectionism spiral of the 1930s did not 
reappear in 2009. We claimed that the presence of a thick network of IGOs, characterizing the 
current international system, decreases uncertainty among countries. In turn, this helps states to 
solve the coordination problem that is particularly severe during such a downturn. Specifically, 
by receiving assurance that other countries are not going to defect, each state has a low incentive 
to implement beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the first place, making cooperation possible even 
in tough times.  
 
In this respect, our argument is similar in spirit to the one developed by Helen V. Milner (1988) 
in Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Comparing 
trade policy formulation in 1920s and 1970s, Milner (1988) argues that the growth of economic 
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 See at http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/2009/05/taleb-global-crisis-vastly-worse-
than.html [consulted on January 12, 2010]. 
34
 Statement reported by Reuters on January 22, 2008. 
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ties among firms reduces their interest in protection by increasing its costs. Similarly, we 
developed the macro version of this claim. We argued that the presence of IGOs generates ties 
among countries and in turn, decreases their interest in protectionism by raising the quality and 
the quantity of information available to states. The empirical analysis carried out in this study 
supports this claim. 
   
Our aim in this paper was to apply a theory that is firmly grounded in the international relations 
literature, i.e. international organizations increase information among states (Abbott and Snidal, 
1998; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Morrow, 1994), to an extreme case, i.e. a very serious economic 
crisis, to see if these were any evidence that the theory holds. It did and that is good news for the 
global economic system. In developing and testing the hypotheses on the role of international 
institutions in times of economic crisis, we also took account of important domestic political 
variables, including democracy, partisanship, veto players, and government effectiveness.   
 
The take away point from this study is that globalization that is often, and often rightly, blamed 
for every disease of the world economy is a double-edged sword for crises. On the one hand, 
globalization, through interdependence, makes crises more frequent and makes the diffusion of 
crises faster and wider.
35
 On the other hand, globalization, through the presence of international 
organizations, produces ties among countries and may well help to mitigate the severity and the 
duration of crises.  
 
                                                          
35
 The crisis problem was one of the dominant features of the 1990s: the EMS crisis of 1992-3, 




Our next steps in this project include gathering of additional data on the dependent variable: 
protectionism in trade policy. We plan to update the data from Global Trade Alert to the end of 
2010, so as to gain another year of coverage on state measures affecting trade that have been 
adopted during this economic crisis. The analysis will also disaggregate the various state 
measures, to test separately the hypotheses in this study for different types of protectionist policy 
that can be differentiated among tariff measures, anti-dumping measures, and safeguard 
mechanisms, among others. We also hope to offer a more refined categorization of international 
organizations in future work, by categorizing more carefully the IGOs included in this analysis 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Number 
of Obs. 
Protectionism 3.51 8.23 0 51 167 
ΔGDP 4.19 3.68 -14.06 16.40 167 
Ln(GDP Per Capita) 1.69 1.20 .10 4.51 167 
Trade Openness .33 .76 .01 5.38 167 
Exchange Rate .48 .50 0 1 167 
Ln(Population) 15.76 1.76 11.18 20.87 167 
Type of Regime 3.42 2.15 0 10 167 
Veto Players .29 .21 0 .71 164 
Govern. Effect. 2.48 .98 .29 4.7 167 
IGOs 64.77 21.07 9 145 167 
Econ. IGOs 9.67 3.42 2 23 167 
Political IGOs 55.10 18.71 6 125 167 
Minimalist IGOs 88.1 24.3 6 129 167 
Structured IGOs 55.10 18.71 6 54 167 
Interventionist IGOs 10.15 2.34 3 17 167 
No. of PTAs 7.71 9.17 0 27 167 
WTO .83 .37 0 1 167 
Dyadic Protectionism   .17    1.09       0 34 27390   
 Ln(GDP) - Cheater 4.23    3.67 -14.055      16.395 27390 
Ln(GDPpc) - Cheater 1.68 1.19 .10     4.51 27390 
 Trade  3.07    2.61 0 12.67 27390 
Exchange Rate .48 .50 0 1 27390 
 ΔGDP - Cheater 4.23    3.67 -14.055      16.395 27390 
 Ln(Population) - Cheater 15.73 1.73 11.18 20.87 27390 
Type of Regime - Cheater 5.39 4.06 0 10 27390 
Veto Players – Cheater .29 .21 0 .71 26895 
Govern. Effect. - Cheater 2.46 .97 .29 4.7 27390 
Dyadic  IGOs 28.50     10.33 5 98 27390 
Dyadic  Econ. IGOs 4.37    2.00 0 19 27390 
Dyadic  Political IGOs 24.13    8.72 3 79 27390 
Dyadic Minimalist IGOs 13.86      5.80 2 52 27390 
Dyadic  Structured  IGOs 17.71     4.01 6 39 27390 
Dyadic Interventionist IGOs 6.93     1.73 2 18 27390 
PTA .16     .36 0 1 27390 
Dyadic WTO .69 .46 0 1 27390 












Econ. IGOs  -.91** 
(.39) 
 
Political IGOs  .15** 
(.07) 
 
PTAs  -.19** 
(.08) 
 
WTO  -3.25    
4.72 
 
Interventionist IGOs   -.03 
(.05) 










































































Observations 167 167 167 
Censored Obs. 







Log likelihood -374.13 -371.84 -373.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








[min, max] [μ-σ, μ+σ] 
Economic IGOs -19 -5 
No. of PTAs -5 -3 
Political IGOs +18 +6 
GDP +14 +5 
Table 3 Predicted values: The effect of Economic IGOs and PTAs on protectionist policies compared with the 


















Covariates (4) (5) (6) 
IGOs 0.0157***   
 0.00562   
Econ. IGOs  -0.245***  
  0.0525  
Political IGOs  0.123***  
  0.0166  
PTA  -0.470**  
  0.189  
WTO – Cheater  -4.848***  
  0.474  
WTO – Target  -0.00378  
  0.248  
Interventionist  IGOs   0.00628 
   0.0152 
Non-Interventionist  IGOs   -0.0142 
   0.0262 
Trade 0.315*** 0.286*** 0.318*** 
 0.0578 0.0517 0.0600 
Ln(GDPpc) – Cheater 0.377*** -0.0557 0.385*** 
 0.0790 0.0618 0.0793 
Ln(GDPpc) – Target 0.0591 0.0305 0.0546 
 0.0768 0.0695 0.0777 
Ln(GDP) – Cheater 0.27 0.18*** 0.25 
 0.39 0.03 0.41 
Ln(GDP) – Target 3.25e-05 7.48e-05 2.37e-05 
 5.92e-05 5.42e-05 5.86e-05 
Type Regime – Cheater 0.212*** 0.142*** 0.191*** 
 0.0324 0.0255 0.0315 
Type Regime – Target -0.0356 -0.0541** -0.0481* 
 0.0287 0.0274 0.0284 
Govern. Effect – Cheater -0.971*** -0.274*** -0.961*** 
 0.140 0.101 0.136 
Govern. Effect – Target 0.436*** 0.490*** 0.402*** 
 0.0989 0.0936 0.0990 
Veto Player – Cheater -2.525*** 1.270*** -2.280*** 
 0.518 0.300 0.487 
Veto Player – Target 0.859* 0.376 1.047** 
 0.495 0.447 0.514 
Exchange Rate – Cheater 0.794*** 1.115*** 0.838*** 
 0.136 0.147 0.146 
Exchange Rate – Target 0.00909 0.222 0.0257 
 0.166 0.147 0.165 
Ln(Population) – Cheater 0.452*** 0.452*** 0.453*** 
 0.00970 0.00973 0.00967 
Ln(Population) – Target 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 
 0.00963 0.00964 0.00962 
GDP Growth – Cheater -0.0345*** -0.0352*** -0.0341*** 
 0.00402 0.00399 0.00406 
 48 
GDP Growth – Target -0.0513*** -0.0515*** -0.0511*** 
 0.00386 0.00386 0.00387 
Constant -12.67*** -12.65*** -12.68*** 
 0.256 0.256 0.255 
ρ -.14769*** -.1219*** -.17873*** 
 .031364 .0405014 .0371896 
λ -.48079*** -.3579*** -.5834*** 
 .1094796 .1220696 .1242639 
Observations 27263 27263 27263 
Censored Obs. 25628 25628 25628 
Uncensored Obs. 1635 1635 1635 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






















[min, max] [μ-σ, μ+σ] [0, 1] 
Dyadic Economic IGOs -4.75 -1  
PTAs   -.47 
WTO – Cheater   -4.85 
Trade +3.6 +1.5  
Exchange Rate - Cheater   +1.1 
Democracy- Cheater +1.4 1.1  
Gov. Effect. -1.2 -0.5  
Table 5 Predicted values: The effect of Economic IGOs and PTAs on protectionist policies compared with the 

















Covariates (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PTA 0.208 0.0522 0.408 0.111 
 0.345 0.456 1.041 0.243 
Econ. IGOs 0.351*** 0.309*** 0.971*** -0.200*** 
 0.0851 0.0751 0.126 0.0553 
PTA*Regime – Cheater -0.0111    
 0.0338    
PTA*Regime – Target -0.0853*    
 0.0480    
Econ. IGOs*Regime – Cheater -0.0621***    
 0.0101    
Econ. IGOs*Regime – Target -0.00178    
 0.00833    
Type Regime – Cheater 0.489*** 0.0829*** 0.146*** 0.178*** 
 0.0654 0.0243 0.0262 0.0271 
Type Regime – Target 0.0144 -0.0245 -0.0235 -0.0361 
 0.0475 0.0280 0.0270 0.0276 
PTA*Veto Player – Cheater  0.0661   
  0.0782   
PTA*Veto Player – Target  -0.225**   
  0.0922   
Econ. IGOs*Veto Player – Cheater  -0.125***   
  0.0165   
Econ. IGOs*Veto Player – Target  -0.00550   
  0.0116   
Veto Player – Cheater 0.882*** 9.511*** 0.921*** 1.071*** 
 0.313 1.133 0.306 0.318 
Veto Player – Target -0.0449 0.898 -0.165 0.216 
 0.445 0.801 0.441 0.444 
PTA*Right Party – Cheater    -1.121*** 
    0.344 
PTA*Right Party – Target    -0.644 
    0.464 
Econ. IGOs*Right Party – Cheater    -0.0532** 
    0.0226 
Econ. IGOs*Right Party – Target    0.00805 
    0.0310 
Right Party – Cheater    -0.02516 
    0.342299 
Right Party – Target    0.418562 
    0.385734 
Gov. Effect*PTA – Cheater   0.0284  
   0.191  
Gov. Effect*PTA – Target   -0.194  
   0.210  
Gov. Effect*Econ. IGOs – Cheater   -0.197***  
   0.0265  
Gov. Effect*Econ. IGOs – Target   0.00117  
   0.0237  
Govern. Effect – Cheater -0.273*** -0.358*** 0.909*** -0.330*** 
 0.0886 0.0988 0.187 0.0982 
Govern. Effect – Target 0.388*** 0.398*** 0.372** 0.478*** 
 51 
 0.0867 0.0873 0.155 0.0901 
Trade 0.193*** 0.201*** 0.151*** 0.275*** 
 0.0464 0.0462 0.0454 0.0506 
Ln(GDPpc) – Cheater 0.0334 0.0436 0.0104 -0.0594 
 0.0567 0.0621 0.0580 0.0589 
Ln(GDPpc) – Target 0.0161 0.0177 -0.00156 0.0416 
 0.0681 0.0665 0.0663 0.0683 
Ln(GDP) – Cheater 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 
 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Ln(GDP) – Target 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Exchange Rate – Cheater 0.707*** 0.662*** 0.598*** 1.016*** 
 0.129 0.128 0.130 0.144 
Exchange Rate – Target -0.143 -0.0559 -0.182 0.147 
 0.156 0.156 0.159 0.151 
Political IGOs 0.110*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 
 0.0152 0.0155 0.0154 0.0163 
WTO – Cheater -5.269*** -5.408*** -5.344*** -4.737*** 
 0.499 0.510 0.492 0.465 
WTO – Target -0.443* -0.425* -0.651** 0.0296 
 0.266 0.248 0.256 0.244 
Ln(Population) – Cheater 0.451*** 0.452*** 0.450*** 0.452*** 
 0.00959 0.00960 0.00958 0.00971 
Ln(Population) – Target 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 
 0.00958 0.00958 0.00958 0.00964 
GDP Growth – Cheater -0.0339*** -0.0341*** -0.0339*** -0.0350*** 
 0.00397 0.00398 0.00396 0.00399 
GDP Growth – Target -0.0514*** -0.0514*** -0.0515*** -0.0515*** 
 0.00385 0.00385 0.00385 0.00386 
Constant -12.64*** -12.65*** -12.61*** -12.66*** 
 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.256 
ρ -0.3142094 -0.29899 -0.34387 -0.14956 
 0.0322237 0.032821 0.031584 0.03873 
λ -0.9275409 -0.87692 -1.01493 -0.43521 
 0.1184322 0.116774 0.116413 0.117988 
Observations 27263 27263 27263 6902 
Censored Obs. 25628 25628 25628 6284 
Uncensored Obs. 1635 1635 1635 618 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 7 Negative binomial regression with sample selection.  
 
 
Covariates (11) (12) 








No. of PTAs -.02*** 
.009 
 
PTAs  -.14*** 
.05 




WTO – Target  .04 
.08 




Ln(GDP) - Target  .18*** 
.01 




Ln(GDPpc) – Target  -.01 
.03 
Trade Openness 2.21*** 
.81 
 
Trade  .08*** 
.01 




Exchange Rate – Target  .08** 
.04 




Type of Regime – Target  -.02*** 
.008 




Veto Players – Target  .26* 
.13 










Observations 83 1,635 
Log likelihood -205.71 -2901.45 
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Figure 2 Countries targeted by the largest number of protectionist measures during the current crisis. 
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Marginal Effect of Veto Players on Protectionism As Econ. IGO Changes
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Marginal Effect of PTA on Protectionism As Partisanship Changes
